I'm building a tool for admins in the enterprise context. The app needs to do some things as root, such as executing a script.
I was hoping to implement a workflow where the user clicks a button, then will be shown the authentication prompt, enter the credentials and then execute the desired action. However, I couldn't find a way to implement this. AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges looked promising, but that's deprecated since 10.7.
I've now tried to use a launch daemon that's contained in the app bundle with XPC, but that seems overly complicated and has several downsides (daemon with global machservice and the approval of a launch daemon suggests to the user that something's always running in the background). Also I'd like to stream the output of the executed scripts in real time back to the UI which seems very complicated to implement in this fashion.
Is there a better way to enable an app to perform authorized privilege escalation for certain actions? What about privileged helper tools? I couldn't find any documentation about them. I know privilege escalation is not allowed in the App Store, but that's not relevant for us.
Prioritize user privacy and data security in your app. Discuss best practices for data handling, user consent, and security measures to protect user information.
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I have a binary executable which needs to be given Accessibility Permissions so it can inject keypresses and mouse moves. This was always possible up to macOS 15 - when the first keypress arrived the Accessibility Permissions window would open and allow me to add the executable. However this no longer works in macOS 26: the window still opens, I navigate to the executable file and select it but it doesn't appear in the list. No error message appears.
I'm guessing that this may be due to some tightening of security in Tahoe but I need to figure out what to change with my executable to allow it to work.
Attempting to DECRYPT a cipher message using the Apple API SecKeyCreateDecryptedData(privateKey, .rsaEncryptionOAEPSHA256, encryptedMessage). Decryption ALWAYS fails for every algorithm.
SecKeyCreateDecryptedDataWithParameters Error: `Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-50 "algid:encrypt:RSA:OAEP:SHA256: algorithm not supported by the key <SecKeyRef:('com.yubico.Authenticator.TokenExtension:5621CDF8560D4C412030886584EC4C9E394CC376DD9738B0CCBB51924FC26EB6') 0x3007fd150>" UserInfo={numberOfErrorsDeep=0, NSDescription=algid:encrypt:RSA:OAEP:SHA256: algorithm not supported by the key <SecKeyRef:('com.yubico.Authenticator.TokenExtension:5621CDF8560D4C412030886584EC4C9E394CC376DD9738B0CCBB51924FC26EB6') 0x3007fd150>}`
Decryption failed: SecKeyCreateDecryptedData returned nil.
Error: One or more parameters passed to a function were not valid.
When checking with SecKeyIsAlgorithmSupported(privateKey, .decrypt, <ANYalgorithm>) all algorithms fail. Btw - The privateKey does support decryption when retrieving the attributes.
Important to know:
The private key is a reference to an external private key placed in the iOS Keychain via a 3rd party CryptoTokenKit Extension app. When I perform, the SecKeyCreateSignature(...) and pass in the SAME privateKey reference, the OS automatically calls the 3rd party app to perform a successful signing with the private key that reside on a YubiKey.
Here's my code for obtaining the private key reference from an Identity:
func getKeyPairFromIdentity() -> (privateKey: SecKey, publicKey: SecKey)? {
let query = NSDictionary(
dictionary: [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassIdentity,
kSecAttrTokenID as String: self.tokenID!,
kSecReturnRef as String: kCFBooleanTrue as Any
]
)
var identityRef: CFTypeRef?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query, &identityRef)
if status == errSecSuccess, let identity = identityRef {
var privateKeyRef: SecKey?
let keyStatus = SecIdentityCopyPrivateKey(identity as! SecIdentity, &privateKeyRef)
if keyStatus == errSecSuccess, let privateKey = privateKeyRef {
let publicKey = SecKeyCopyPublicKey(privateKey)
if let publicKey = publicKey {
print("Private and public keys extracted successfully.")
return (privateKey, publicKey)
} else {
print("Failed to extract public key from private key.")
return nil
}
} else {
print("SecIdentityCopyPrivateKey: Private key not found error: \(keyStatus)")
return nil
}
} else {
print("SecIdentity not found or error: \(status)")
return nil
}
}
Hello. I want to do the following and need your help.
I want to import a certificate (pkcs#12) into my macOS keychain with a setting that prohibits exporting the certificate.
I want to import the certificate (pkcs#12) into my login keychain or system keychain.
I was able to achieve [1] with the help of the following threads, but have the following problems.
https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/677314?answerId=824644022#824644022
how to import into login keychain or system keychain
How to achieve this without using the deprecated API
To import into the login keychain, I could use the “SecKeychainCopyDefault” function instead of the “SecKeychainCopySearchList” function,
However, both of these functions were deprecated APIs.
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/seckeychaincopysearchlist(_:)
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/seckeychaincopydefault(_:)
I checked the following URL and it seems that using the SecItem API is correct, but I could not figure out how to use it.
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/technotes/tn3137-on-mac-keychains
Is there any way to import them into the login keychain or system keychain without using these deprecated APIs?
Hi,
When calling generateAssertion on DCAppAttestService.shared, it gives invalidKey error when there was an update for an offloaded app.
The offloading and reinstall always works fine if it is the same version on app store that was offloaded from device,
but if there is an update and the app tries to reuse the keyID from previous installation for generateAssertion, attestation service rejects the key with error code 3 (invalid key) for a significant portion of our user.
In our internal testing it failed for more than a third of the update attempts.
STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
install v1 from app store
generate key using DCAppAttestService.shared.generateKey
Attest this key using DCAppAttestService.shared.attestKey
Send the attestation objection to our server and verify with apple servers
Generate assertions for network calls to backend using DCAppAttestService.shared.generateAssertion with keyID from step 2
Device offloads the app (manually triggered by user, or automatically by iOS)
A new version v2 is published to App Store
Use tries to open the app
Latest version is download from the App Store
App tries to use the keyID from step 2 to generate assertions
DCAppAttestService throws invalidKey error (Error Domain=com.apple.devicecheck.error Code=3)
Step 7 is critical here, if there is no new version of the app, the reinstalled v1 can reuse the key from step 2 without any issues
Is this behaviour expected?
Is there any way we can make sure the key is preserved between offloaded app updates?
Thanks
In some crashlog files, there are additional pieces of information related to codesigning.
I can understand what most of themcorresponds to (ID, TeamID, Flags, Validation Category). But there is one I have some doubt about: Trust Level.
As far as I can tell (or at least what Google and other search engines say), this is an unsigned 32 bit integer that defines the trust level with -1 being untrusted, 0, being basically an Apple executable and other potential bigger values corresponding to App Store binaries, Developer ID signature, etc.
Yet, I'm not able to find a corresponding detailed documentation about this on Apple's developer website.
I also had a look at the LightweightCodeRequirements "include" file and there does not seem to be such a field available.
[Q] Is there any official documentation listing the different values for this trust level value and providing a clear description of what it corresponds to?
Trying to validate external reference identifiers with SecTrustEvaluateWithError Method by setting reference Ids to SecPolicyCreateSSL() & SecPolicyCreateWithProperties()
But two concerns are -
Validates for correct reference IDs but gives error for combination of wrong & correct reference Ids
398 days validity works mandatorily before reference Ids check.
Is there any other to validate external reference Ids?, which give flexibility
To pass multiple combinations of reference IDs string (wrong, correct, IP, DNS)
To validate reference ID without days validity of 398.
Please suggest. Any help here is highly appreciated.
Having trouble decrypting a string using an encryption key and an IV.
var key: String
var iv: String
func decryptData(_ encryptedText: String) -> String?
{
if let textData = Data(base64Encoded: iv + encryptedText) {
do {
let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.SealedBox(combined: textData)
let key = SymmetricKey(data: key.data(using: .utf8)!)
let decryptedData = try AES.GCM.open(sealedBox, using: key)
return String(data: decryptedData, encoding: .utf8)
} catch {
print("Decryption failed: \(error)")
return nil
}
}
return nil
}
Proper coding choices aside (I'm just trying anything at this point,) the main problem is opening the SealedBox. If I go to an online decryption site, I can paste in my encrypted text, the encryption key, and the IV as plain text and I can encrypt and decrypt just fine.
But I can't seem to get the right combo in my Swift code. I don't have a "tag" even though I'm using the combined option. How can I make this work when all I will be receiving is the encrypted text, the encryption key, and the IV. (the encryption key is 256 bits)
Try an AES site with a key of 32 digits and an IV of 16 digits and text of your choice. Use the encrypted version of the text and then the key and IV in my code and you'll see the problem. I can make the SealedBox but I can't open it to get the decrypted data. So I'm not combining the right things the right way. Anyone notice the problem?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Hi! We are developing an authentication plugin for macOS that integrates with the system's authentication flow. The plugin is designed to prompt the user for approval via a push notification in our app before allowing access. The plugin is added as the first mechanism in the authenticate rule, followed by the default builtin:authenticate as a fallback.
When the system requests authentication (e.g., during screen unlock), our plugin successfully displays the custom UI and sends a push notification to the user's device. However, I've encountered the following issue:
If the user does not approve the push notification within ~30 seconds, the system resets the screen lock (expected behavior).
If the user approves the push notification within approximately 30 seconds but doesn’t start entering their password before the timeout expires, the system still resets the screen lock before they can enter their password, effectively canceling the session.
What I've Tried:
Attempted to imitate mouse movement after the push button was clicked to keep the session active.
Created a display sleep prevention assertion using IOKit to prevent the screen from turning off.
Used the caffeinate command to keep the display and system awake.
Tried setting the result as allow for the authorization request and passing an empty password to prevent the display from turning off.
I also checked the system logs when this issue occurred and found the following messages:
___loginwindow: -[LWScreenLock (Private) askForPasswordSecAgent] | localUser = >timeout
loginwindow: -[LWScreenLock handleUnlockResult:] _block_invoke | ERROR: Unexpected _lockRequestedBy of:7 sleeping screen
loginwindow: SleepDisplay | enter
powerd: Process (loginwindow) is requesting display idle___
These messages suggest that the loginwindow process encounters a timeout condition, followed by the display entering sleep mode. Despite my attempts to prevent this behavior, the screen lock still resets prematurely.
Questions:
Is there a documented (or undocumented) system timeout for the entire authentication flow during screen unlock that I cannot override?
Are there any strategies for pausing or extending the authentication timeout to allow for complex authentication flows like push notifications?
Any guidance or insights would be greatly appreciated. Thank you!
Hello,
I've developed a macOS app with an AutoFill Credential Provider extension that functions as a passkey provider. In the registration flow, I want my app to appear as a passkey provider only when specific conditions are met.
Is there a way to inspect the request from the web before the passkey provider selection list is displayed to the user, determine whether my app can handle it, and then use that result to instruct the OS on whether to include my app in the passkey provider selection list?
Alternatively, is there a way to predefine conditions that must be met before my app is offered as a passkey provider in the selection list?
Thanks!
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Extensions
Autofill
Authentication Services
Passkeys in iCloud Keychain
I am developing a daemon-based product that needs a cryptographic, non-spoofable proof of machine identity so a remote management server can grant permissions based on the physical machine.
I was thinking to create a signing key in the Secure Enclave and use a certificate signed by that key as the machine identity. The problem is that the Secure Enclave key I can create is only accessible from user context, while my product runs as a system daemon and must not rely on user processes or launchAgents.
Could you please advise on the recommended Apple-supported approaches for this use case ?
Specifically, Is there a supported way for a system daemon to generate and use an unremovable Secure Enclave key during phases like the pre-logon, that doesn't have non user context (only the my application which created this key/certificate will have permission to use/delete it)
If Secure Enclave access from a daemon is not supported, what Apple-recommended alternatives exist for providing a hardware-backed machine identity for system daemons?
I'd rather avoid using system keychain, as its contents may be removed or used by root privileged users.
The ideal solution would be that each Apple product, would come out with a non removable signing certificate, that represent the machine itself (lets say that the cetificate name use to represent the machine ID), and can be validated by verify that the root signer is "Apple Root CA"
My high-level goal is to add support for Game Mode in a Java game, which launches via a macOS "launcher" app that runs the actual java game as a separate process (e.g. using the java command line tool).
I asked this over in the Graphics & Games section and was told this, which is why I'm reposting this here.
I'm uncertain how to speak to CLI tools and Java games launched from a macOS app. These sound like security and sandboxing questions which we recommend you ask about in those sections of the forums.
The system seems to decide whether to enable Game Mode based on values in the Info.plist (e.g. for LSApplicationCategoryType and GCSupportsGameMode). However, the child process can't seem to see these values. Is there a way to change that?
(The rest of this post is copied from my other forums post to provide additional context.)
Imagine a native macOS app that acts as a "launcher" for a Java game.** For example, the "launcher" app might use the Swift Process API or a similar method to run the java command line tool (lets assume the user has installed Java themselves) to run the game.
I have seen How to Enable Game Mode. If the native launcher app's Info.plist has the following keys set:
LSApplicationCategoryType set to public.app-category.games
LSSupportsGameMode set to true (for macOS 26+)
GCSupportsGameMode set to true
The launcher itself can cause Game Mode to activate if the launcher is fullscreened. However, if the launcher opens a Java process that opens a window, then the Java window is fullscreened, Game Mode doesn't seem to activate. In this case activating Game Mode for the launcher itself is unnecessary, but you'd expect Game Mode to activate when the actual game in the Java window is fullscreened.
Is there a way to get Game Mode to activate in the latter case?
** The concrete case I'm thinking of is a third-party Minecraft Java Edition launcher, but the issue can also be demonstrated in a sample project (FB13786152). It seems like the official Minecraft launcher is able to do this, though it's not clear how. (Is its bundle identifier hardcoded in the OS to allow for this? Changing a sample app's bundle identifier to be the same as the official Minecraft launcher gets the behavior I want, but obviously this is not a practical solution.)
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Games
Inter-process communication
macOS
Performance
Trying to apply 'always trust' to certificate added to keychain using both SecItemAdd() and SecPKCS12Import() with SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings().
I created a launchdaemon for this purpose.
AuthorizationDB is modified so that any process running in root can apply trust to certificate.
let option = SecTrustSettingsResult.trustRoot.rawValue
// SecTrustSettingsResult.trustAsRoot.rawValue for non-root certificates
let status = SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings(secCertificate, SecTrustSettingsDomain.admin, [kSecTrustSettingsResult: NSNumber(value: option.rawValue)] as CFTypeRef).
Above code is used to trust certificates and it was working on os upto 14.7.4.
In 14.7.5 SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings() returns errAuthorizationInteractionNotAllowed.
In 15.5 modifying authorization db with AuthorizationRightSet() itself is returning errAuthorizationDenied.Tried manually editing authorization db via terminal and same error occurred.
Did apple update anything on Security framework?
Any other way to trust certificates?
I recently turned on the enhanced security options for my macOS app in Xcode 26.0.1 by adding the Enhanced Security capability in the Signing and Capabilities tab. Then, Xcode adds the following key-value sets (with some other key-values) to my app's entitlements file.
<key>com.apple.security.hardened-process.enhanced-security-version</key>
<integer>1</integer>
<key>com.apple.security.hardened-process.platform-restrictions</key>
<integer>2</integer>
These values appear following the documentation about the enhanced security feature (Enabling enhanced security for your app) and the app works without any issues.
However, when I submitted a new version to the Mac App Store, my submission was rejected, and I received the following message from the App Review team via the App Store Connect.
Guideline 2.4.5(i) - Performance
Your app incorrectly implements sandboxing, or it contains one or more entitlements with invalid values. Please review the included entitlements and sandboxing documentation and resolve this issue before resubmitting a new binary.
Entitlement "com.apple.security.hardened-process.enhanced-security-version" value must be boolean and true.
Entitlement "com.apple.security.hardened-process.platform-restrictions" value must be boolean and true.
When I changed those values directly in the entitlements file based on this message, the app appears to still work. However, these settings are against the description in the documentation I mentioned above and against the settings Xcode inserted after changing the GUI setting view.
So, my question is, which settings are actually correct to enable the Enhanced Security and the Additional Runtime Platform Restrictions?
Hello,
I'm an application developer related to Apple system extensions. I developed an endpoint security system extension that can run normally before the 14.x system. However, after I upgraded to 15.x, I found that when I uninstalled and reinstalled my system extension, although the system extension was installed successfully, a system warning box would pop up when I clicked enable in the Settings, indicating a failure.
I conducted the following test. I reinstalled a brand-new MAC 15.x system. When I installed my applications, the system extensions could be installed successfully and enabled normally. However, when I uninstalled and reinstalled, my system extension couldn't be enabled properly and a system warning popped up as well. I tried disabling SIP and enabling System Extension Developers, but it still didn't work.
When the system warning box pops up, I can see some error log information through the console application, including an error related to
Failed to authorize right 'com.apple.system-extensions.admin' by client '/System/Library/ExtensionKit/Extensions/SettingsSystemExtensionController.appex' [2256] for authorization created by '/System/Library/ExtensionKit/Extensions/SettingsSystemExtensionController.appex' [2256] (3,0) (-60005) (engine 179)
as shown in the screenshot.
The same problem, mentioned in Cannot approve some extensions in MacOS Sequoia , but there is no solution
In my app, I use SecItem to store some data in the Keychain. I’d like to know — when a user sets up a new iPhone and transfers data from the old device, will those Keychain items be migrated or synced to the new device?
Hi,
how can you authenticate a User through Biometrics with iPhone Passcode as Fallback in the Autofill Credential Provider Extension?
In the App it works without a problem. In the Extension I get
"Caller is not running foreground"
Yeah, it isn't, as it's just a sheet above e.g. Safari.
I'd like to avoid having the user setup a Passcode dedicated to my App, especially because FaceID is way faster.
Does anybody know how to achieve iOS native Auth in the extension?
Please let me know, a code sample would be appreciated.
Regards,
Mia
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Face ID
Touch ID
Local Authentication
Authentication Services
I'm seeing some odd behavior which may be a bug. I've broken it down to a least common denominator to reproduce it. But maybe I'm doing something wrong.
I am opening a file read-write. I'm then mapping the file read-only and private:
void* pointer = mmap(NULL, 17, PROT_READ, MAP_FILE | MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
I then unmap the memory and close the file. After the close, eslogger shows me this:
{"close":{"modified":false,[...],"was_mapped_writable":false}}
Which makes sense.
I then change the mmap statement to:
void* pointer = mmap(NULL, 17, PROT_READ, MAP_FILE | MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
I run the new code and and the close looks like:
{"close":{"modified":false, [....], "was_mapped_writable":true}}
Which also makes sense.
I then run the original again (ie, with MAP_PRIVATE vs. MAP_SHARED) and the close looks like:
{"close":{"modified":false,"was_mapped_writable":true,[...]}
Which doesn't appear to be correct.
Now if I just open and close the file (again, read-write) and don't mmap anything the close still shows:
{"close":{ [...], "was_mapped_writable":true,"modified":false}}
And the same is true if I open the file read-only.
It will remain that way until I delete the file. If I recreate the file and try again, everything is good until I map it MAP_SHARED.
I tried this with macOS 13.6.7 and macOS 15.0.1.
Hello,
I’m storing some values in the Keychain with the attribute ‘ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly’ (https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly).
When I migrate user data between iPhones via iCloud, this behaves as expected and the keys are not preserved.
However, when I migrate using a direct connection between two devices, the keys are preserved, which seems to contradict the attribute’s intent.
Is this a known behavior, and if so, is there a workaround?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
There’s a critical, actively exploited vulnerability in Apple’s iOS activation servers allowing unauthenticated XML payload injection:
https://cyberpress.org/apple-ios-activation-vulnerability/
This flaw targets the core activation process, bypassing normal security checks. Despite the severity, it’s barely discussed in public security channels.
Why is this not being addressed or publicly acknowledged? Apple developers and security researchers should urgently review and audit activation flows—this is a direct attack vector on device trust integrity.
Any insights or official response appreciated.