I’d like to ask whether Apple plans to enable Encrypted Client Hello (ECH, RFC 9849) opportunistically by default across the iOS/iPadOS system networking stack. Apple already exposes ECH support through sec_protocol_options_set_enable_encrypted_client_hello(), but there currently appears to be no system-wide preference, configuration profile, or MDM policy to enable ECH for normal system networking clients such as URLSession, CFNetwork, WebKit/Safari, and other apps relying on Apple’s networking stack. I tested this with a working ECH deployment: A domain publishes a valid DNS HTTPS/SVCB record containing an ech parameter. The corresponding TLS endpoint supports ECH. iOS successfully queries and receives the HTTPS/SVCB record. Safari / normal system networking clients then connect to the domain. Packet capture still shows the real SNI in the plaintext ClientHello, and ECH is not attempted. If the same connection is explicitly configured to enable ECH at the TLS protocol-options level, ECH can be used successfully. It would be useful if iOS/iPadOS could: Opportunistically enable ECH by default whenever TLS 1.3 and a valid ECHConfig are available. Optionally provide a system-wide / MDM policy for enabling ECH. Ideally provide an “ECH required” policy that fails closed rather than falling back to plaintext SNI. This would improve hostname privacy for applications using the system networking stack without requiring every application developer to explicitly opt in. I have submitted this through Feedback Assistant as: FB24334961 — Enable Encrypted Client Hello (ECH, RFC 9849) by default for system TLS connections Has anyone found an existing system-level way to enable ECH, or does anyone know whether Apple plans to make this the default behavior?

I am implementing push notifications for a web application running as a PWA on iPad using Web Push. When sending a push notification to the web application, I received a 410 response from the server. I would like to understand the cause and reason for receiving this 410 response. The library used for sending push notifications is a commonly used JavaScript Web Push library. Could you please explain under what circumstances Apple Web Push endpoints return a 410 response, and whether this indicates that the existing push subscription is no longer valid and should be re‑registered.

When using passkeys stored in iCloud Keychain (Passwords app) via Passkey Autofill in browsers other than Safari, the userVerification parameter is ignored and user verification (UV) is not performed. As a result, relying party servers that require userVerification = required fail validation because the UV flag is not set, causing passkey authentication to fail. This issue occurs when the following setting is disabled: Settings → Face ID & Passcode → Use Face ID For → Password AutoFill The issue is reproducible only with the following combination: Non-Safari browsers (e.g. Chrome) Passkeys stored in iCloud Keychain (Passwords app) Passkey Autofill The issue does not occur in the following cases: Safari with passkeys stored in any credential manager Non-Safari browsers using credential managers other than iCloud Keychain Steps to Reproduce: Go to Settings → General → Autofill & Passwords, and enable the Passwords app under “Autofill From”. Go to Settings → Face ID & Passcode → Use Face ID For, and disable “Password AutoFill”. Open Chrome and navigate to https://webauthn.io Enter a username and tap “Register” to create a passkey using the Passwords app (iCloud Keychain). On webauthn.io, go to Advanced Settings → Authentication Settings, and set “User Verification” to “Required”. Reload the page, tap the input field, and perform Passkey Autofill. User Verification is not triggered, and “Authentication failed” is displayed on webauthn.io. === This issue has already been reported via Feedback Assistant as FB21756948. I am posting here to confirm whether this behavior is working as intended or represents a bug, and to make other developers aware of the current behavior.

Filed as FB24092251. On macOS 27.0 beta (26A5388g), clicking into any text input inside a WKWebView in a Mac Catalyst app makes focus oscillate forever and typing does nothing. CPU pegs at 100% while the editor is focused. The same binary works fine on macOS 26. The DOM element never actually loses focus. Only the window does: window focus -> activeElement=TEXTAREA.inputarea JS focus -> activeElement=TEXTAREA.inputarea window blur -> activeElement=TEXTAREA.inputarea <- window loses key status JS blur -> activeElement=TEXTAREA.inputarea <- element did not ...repeats indefinitely... Pausing during the loop shows why. Focusing the element sends WebKit into UIKit's software-keyboard machinery, on a platform that has no software keyboard: -[UIKeyboardSceneDelegate containerWindowForViewService:] -[UIKeyboardSceneDelegate _setKeyWindowSceneInputViews:animationStyle:] -[UIKeyboardSceneDelegate _reloadInputViewsForResponder:force:fromBecomeFirstResponder:] -[UIResponder(UIResponderInputViewAdditions) reloadInputViews] -[WKContentView(WKInteraction) _continueElementDidFocus:...] -[WKContentView(WKInteraction) _elementDidFocus:...] WebKit::WebPageProxy::elementDidFocus(...) Building that container steals key status from the web view. First responder ends up on the enclosing _UIHostingView, so key presses are delivered there and immediately cancelled: pressesBegan: [...], focusedItem: monacoEditor firstResponder at keypress: _UIHostingView<...> pressesCancelled: [...] The catch: -becomeFirstResponder cannot be used to recover, because it is the trigger. Calling it re-enters _elementDidFocus and re-arms the loop permanently. So there is no app-side way back — the only API that reclaims the keyboard is the one that breaks it. Minimal repro is just a WKWebView in a UIViewRepresentable inside a SwiftUI hierarchy, with any focusable . No Monaco needed. Partial mitigation, if you hit this: do not echo focus/blur commands back at the web view in response to its own focus events, and treat a blur where document.hasFocus() is false but activeElement is unchanged as a window-level blur rather than an editing-ended event. That stops the runaway loop and keeps your focus state correct — but it does not restore typing. Has anyone found a way to get first responder back to the web view without calling -becomeFirstResponder? Or a way to stop the keyboard scene delegate engaging on Catalyst in the first place? If you can reproduce on 27 beta, please file a duplicate referencing FB24092251.

On iOS 26.5, occasionally when WKWebView calls loadRequest to load a URL containing a fragment, it sends the complete URL to the backend.

Hello Apple engineers and fellow developers, Over the past few weeks I have noticed multiple reports from different developers whose legitimate websites have been classified by Safari as “Fraudulent Website Warning”, despite passing every major public security and reputation check. My websites appear to be affected by the same issue. Domains https://skvoz.net https://skvoz.org Both domains were registered on July 15, 2026. The Fraudulent Website Warning first appeared on July 22, 2026, only one week after registration. Both websites are legitimate services operated by our team. Neither website impersonates another brand, attempts to collect Apple IDs, banking credentials, passwords, or any other sensitive information through deceptive means. Extensive verification performed After the warning appeared, we performed a comprehensive technical and security review. Website security ✅ No malware detected ✅ No phishing content ✅ No unauthorized redirects ✅ No suspicious JavaScript ✅ No mixed-content issues ✅ HTTPS configured correctly ✅ Valid TLS certificates Infrastructure DNS configuration verified SSL certificate chain verified using OpenSSL Server responds correctly over HTTP/2 IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity verified Origin server behaves correctly Cloudflare configuration was thoroughly tested during troubleshooting and ultimately removed from the production setup to eliminate it as a possible cause Reputation checks We verified both domains and the hosting IP address using multiple public reputation services. Results were consistently clean. This included services such as: Google Safe Browsing Google Search Console VirusTotal URLVoid IP reputation databases None of them currently report malware, phishing activity, or any other security issues. Apple-specific actions We have already: submitted a Website Review request; contacted Apple Security via reportphishing @apple.com requesting a manual review. At the time of writing, the warning is still present. One unusual observation One particularly unusual observation is that both of our domains (skvoz.net and skvoz.org) received the warning independently. These are separate domains serving different purposes, yet both appear to have been classified in the same way despite passing the same technical and reputation checks. This made me wonder whether Apple’s reputation system may evaluate related domains or shared infrastructure together. I understand the internal implementation is not public, but I wanted to mention this observation in case it is useful during investigation. Similar reports While investigating this issue, I found several recent reports from other developers describing almost identical behavior. The common pattern is remarkably consistent: Safari displays Fraudulent Website Warning Chrome, Firefox and Edge open the website normally Google Safe Browsing reports the domain as safe VirusTotal reports no malware Google Search Console reports no security issues valid HTTPS certificates relatively new domains no explanation regarding what triggered the warning This suggests the issue may not be isolated to a single website. Questions I would greatly appreciate any guidance from Apple engineers. Does Safari rely solely on Google Safe Browsing, or does Apple maintain an independent reputation database for Fraudulent Website Warning? If Apple maintains its own reputation system, are there any documented technical signals developers should verify? For example: redirects third-party scripts TLS configuration domain age hosting reputation infrastructure characteristics phishing heuristics machine-learning based classification Is there any recommended diagnostic process beyond Website Review? Approximately how long does a manual review usually take? Why I am posting This post is not only about my own websites. Over the past few months I have noticed an increasing number of developers reporting what appear to be false positive Fraudulent Website Warnings affecting legitimate websites. If there have been recent changes to Safari’s reputation or anti-phishing systems, it would be extremely helpful for developers to better understand what technical criteria should be reviewed before requesting reconsideration. Even if the exact detection logic cannot be disclosed, any general guidance on common causes of false positives would help developers resolve issues much more efficiently. Thank you very much for your time.

webkitEnterFullScreen API is supported on iOS for video element, but not for a div element. Also as a fullscreen demo website shown, Safari on macOS supports div element but not on iOS. Is there any plan to add the support in iOS? If not is there any way to fullscreen a div element or make it run as fullscreen on Safari iOS?